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BUILDING THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW*
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.
Legal theory is not held in high repute but there are extenuat-
ing circumstances. Legal theorists cannot describe with the impres-
sive quantitative accuracy of, say, astronomers, but neither are we
presented with a repetition of determining conditions that make such
prediction possible. Nor is predictive weakness confined to the social
sciences; if the facts change, the natural sciences are poor prognosti-
cators, too. For confirmation, look no further than experiences with
earthquake prediction (geological sciences) or weather modification
(atmospheric sciences). And what is the predictive value of that
greatest of biological theories, evolution, and its lynchpin, natural
selection? Furthermore, social science ordinarily is content with
description and an occasional prediction. The law is called upon not
only to predict, using the best that science offers, but also to influ-
ence and direct future events. Legal theorists thus are obliged to
take up the descriptive/predictive side of the coin as well as the nor-
mative; we are called upon to be both scientists and ethicists.'
In the specialty of natural resources law, there is no reason to
expect our tasks of description and prescription to be any easier. We
deal, after all, with the allocation of scarce resources where there are
winners and losers. This leads us quickly into substantive justice
theories based on entitlements, needs, and deserts and process justice
theories extending to each loser his due. Justice theory is imple-
mented through judicial review, and what courts do depends impor-
* This paper was presented initially to the Institute for Natural Resource Law Teachers,
May 28-30, 1981, University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado.
1. One of the difficulties with any purely descriptive, or positive, theory of law is to
account for what happens after the trend is fully disclosed. Assume, arguendo, that judges in
common law tort cases have acted as if they were trying to promote economically efficient
resource allocation. See Landes & Posner, The Positive Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv.
851 (1981). What happens next? Courts will continue to hew to this line only if persuaded of
the normative good sense of the positions heretofore unconsciously adhered to. One attempt to
justify wealth maximization as an ethical value can be found in Posner, Utilitarianism, Eco-
nomics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
2. Many disciplines, economics included, claim as their domain the allocation of scarce
resources. See LIMITS TO ACTION: THE ALLOCATION OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (J. R. Stad-
don, ed., 1980), esp. ch. 7.
214 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
tantly upon behavioral assumptions about people, agencies of govern-
ment, and empirical proof. The sources of these assumptions and
evidence are often the sciences, and I would like to speculate a bit
about how these sciences might influence the role of the courts. I will
attempt to suggest lines of inquiry where descriptive and normative
legal theories of natural resource allocation might draw upon in-
sights from disciplines other than economics which has claimed such
a prominent, and some would say disproportionate, role in contempo-
rary legal scholarship.'
A. Sociobiology
Sociobiology is a science that draws upon the behavior of social
species, especially humans, to gain insight into the rules that govern
social interaction. Under this view somewhere in the human mind is
a "stubborn core" of biological urgency, "and biological necessity,
and biological reason, that culture cannot reach and that reserves
the right, which sooner or later it will exercise, to judge the culture
and resist and revise it. ''5 A sociobiological legal theory could be
based upon human preferences expressed through nonmarket chan-
nels; and I, for one, have sympathy with the idea that nonmarket
human preferences are presumptively as important as the dollar
votes of economic theory.
Of course, when biology speaks, the law need not listen. Ulti-
mately, society, through law, decides which aspects of human nature
to cultivate or to subvert. At a minimum, a reliable science of
human behavior offers empirical insight into whether a particular le-
gal option goes with or against the grain of human nature. With
much greater difficulty, a sociobiological ethical theory could be con-
structed around the idea that the law should tilt towards the biologi-
3. For recent criticisms of the use of economics in legal theory, see Kennedy, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique. 33 STANFORD L. REV. 387 (1981);
Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking,
4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980); Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981); Symposium on Efficiency As A Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980).
4. E. 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (1978); see A. ROSENBERG, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND
THE PREEMPTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 160 (1980) (suggesting that sociobiological findings may
"reveal a real restriction on possible social arrangements"). For a sociobiological interpretation
of tort law, see W. Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort The-
ory. 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980).
5. E. 0. WILSON, supra note 4, at 80 (quoting LIONELL TRILLING, BEYOND CULTURE)
(1979).
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cal preferences of the species.'
By way of example, territoriality is a biological concept in
which the resident animal defends his territory more vigorously than
the intruder who attempts to usurp it, and as a result the first resi-
dent usually wins; in a special sense, the prior appropriator has a
"moral advantage" over later trespassers.7 Descriptively, could it be
said that prior appropriation doctrines throughout natural resources
law reflect a protection of "small territories" as a way of honoring
biological use and occupation? Here the legal entitlement follows
closely the needs and deserts claims which, in part, are biologically
justified. What predictions would a sociobiologically based legal the-
ory make in cases of nuisance, waste, or reserved rights where com-
peting uses trench heavily upon the "home base" of the first appro-
priator? It would predict a strong protection against utilitarian
claims of the invader, and thus would offer support for absolutist
"rights" legal theories presented recently as a counterpoise to eco-
nomic analyses.8 In my view there is empirical evidence for absolu-
tist human vetoes in these doctrines, and they can be read as validat-
ing positive rights theories.9
At a legislative level, policies as diverse as the Homestead Laws,
the 160 acre limitation in the irrigation laws, and the health-based
ambient air standards reflect legislative judgments about what peo-
ple need to live, work, and thrive. They clearly reflect ideas of
nonmarket preferences, needs, deserts, and ultimately a nonmarket
allocation of scarce goods. 10
B. Anthropology and Cultural Choice
Anthropologists "are impressed by the way traditional societies
6. For a discussion of attempts, some of them thoroughly discredited, to use biology in
ethical theory, see A. Edel, Attempts to Derive Definitive Moral Patterns From Biology, in
THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE: READINGS ON ETHICS AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES (A. L. Caplan ed.
1978).
7. See E. 0. WILSON, supra note 4 at 107.
8. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIIOUSLY (1977); Michelman, Norms and
Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015"(1978). A right can be
defined as a legal entitlement dispensable only upon terms of the holder.
9. See Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward a Biological Theory of Taking in Natu-
ral Resources Law, 10 ECOL. L. Q. - (1982). But see Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics,
and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 109 (1979) ("The empirical evidence for a positive
'rights' theory of law is, at this writing, negligible .... ").
10. Compare the "crisis" component in the theory of legislative change developed in J.
E. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY (1977). A sociobiological interpretation could
be given to sporadical political uprisings characterizing pollution policy and especially to oppo-
sition to nuclear power.
19811
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resolve conflicts informally, using devices that both draw upon and
uphold the continuities of social life. The preference is for modes of
dispute settlement, such as mediation and arbitration, that have a
chance of healing rather than rupturing social relations. And the
preferred devices are close to the people."'" Here, the theoretical
premise might be a kind of minimal state. Society speaks, and some-
times the law should listen, by embracing the dispute resolution or
resource allocation methods culturally preferred. Normatively, the
case for a culturally derived law is strengthened to the extent inter-
ests outside of the culture (spillover victims, future generations, and
politically impotent minorities) are not deemed to be adversely af-
fected.'" Much early mining and grazing law could be said to reflect
culturally derived allocation preferences.'"
Consider, in a somewhat different context, the widespread con-
temporary use of advisory committees which are important sources
of cultural law in natural resources.' 4 A key question is whether the
foxes are making up rules to govern fairness among foxes (staking
out hunting grounds) or whether they are assigning supervisory
rights over chickens. If the former, this sort of approach would sup-
port the view that the committee be only culturally "representa-
tive."" If the latter, the conclusion would be that cultural in-groups
11. Selznick, Jurisprudence and Social Policy: Aspirations and Perspectives, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 206, 217 (1980); see Campbell, The War Between the Words: Biological Versus So-
cial Evolution and Some Related Issues, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, May, 1976, at 341.
12. Cf. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977). See also Bat-
tle, Transportation Controls Under the Clean Air Act-An Experience in (Un)cooperative
Federalism. 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1980).
13. See G. C. COGGINS & C. F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW, chs. 6, 8 (1981). For an interesting and effective argument that cow love in India,
deemed preposterously wasteful by Western economic standards, in fact helps people survive in
a low-energy ecosystem in which there is "little room for waste or indolence," see M. HARRIS,
COWS, PIGS, WARS, AND WITCHES: THE RIDDLES OF CULTURE 30 (1974). For an interesting
domestic example of judicial recognition of what I would call cultural law, see State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
14. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 1.11, 1.12 (1977); Cardozo, The Federal
Advisory Committee Act in Operation, 33 AD. L. REV. 1 (1981).
15. 5 U.S.C. app. 1, § 5(b)(2). See also M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1962) (pointing out that increasing numbers of individuals and interests leads to what I would
call cultural exclusion). On the perceived and demonstrated biases of in-group self-regulation
affecting gene-splicing research, see S. L. Reiss, The Regulation of Recombinant DNA Re-
search: A Critique, in SCIENCE AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY 187, 188-93 (S. A. Lakoff, ed.,
1980). But there are strong pressures fo. ..l-group approval: "Where compliance is difficult to
determine, regulation depends for its success on the support of those being regulated. A system
would not be workable if researchers did not believe it was necessary or workable." Id. at 192-
93.
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should have nothing to say about the extent of the hurt inflicted
upon spillover victims. On assumptions of this sort, empirical investi-
gations probably would show advisory committees with the wrong
memberships doing things in the wrong ways.
Indian law also illustrates issues of imposed cultural law which
are of considerable interest -to anthropologists." The culture, pre-
sumably, should be allowed to resolve allocation issues internal to it,
and one could predict a skeptical judicial review if this does not hap-
pen.17 Cultural override is always fraught with increased friction,
high transaction costs, and unforeseeable secondary effects. Thus,
under this view, cultural override should be carefully justified by ref-
erence to external interests; otherwise, the cultural veto power (note
the absolutist tones) should be honored.
Consider also the doctrines of burden on commerce and preemp-
tion which often arise in the context of resource grabs or resource
saves, raising distinct issues of local or cultural preference. I have
often wondered why resource lawyers did not approach the permissi-
ble "burden" (that combination of local policy choices compatable
with national free trade objectives) as they might other allocation
questions. Thus, if the political judgment in Missoula, Montana, is to
ban the local shipment of radioactive wastes, the municipality by ac-
ting first at least demonstrates an intensity of preference the law
sometimes honors. There is no burden on commerce yet, and under a
prior appropriation approach a burden may not exist until jurisdic-
tion seventeen or eighteen joins the bandwagon. The issues are not
litigated this way, of course, and the question ordinarily asked is the
gross hypothetical extent of the burden if all jurisdictions were in-
clined to act.18 The cost of this technique might be an unnecessary
sacrifice of local option.
More disturbing is the tendency in burden of commerce and
preemption litigation to leave out the federal agency that is presum-
ably knowledgeable on the extent of friction between local and na-
tional policy options. In the Puget Sound Oil tanker litigation, 9 con-
16. See THE IMPOSITION OF LAW (S. B. Burman, B. E. Harrell-Bond, eds., 1979).
17. United States v. Washington, 674 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying "close scru-
tiny" to the question of whether tribal autonomy had been maintained for purposes of exercis-
ing fishing rights but finding that it had not).
18. It could be said that the Supreme Court provides implicit support for a prior appro-
priation theory of the commerce clause by sustaining regulatory experimentation upon records
not suggesting an oppressive cumulative effect. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, n.20 (1981).
19. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
19813
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temporary patterns of hard look judicial review would have
demanded that the Coast Guard explain whether it attempted to
supplant local law, to what extent and why and how it weighed local
preferences in the calculation. A theory that strives to respect cul-
tural or local preference would require it. What we usually get in
these cases, however, is a terribly abstract discussion of local prefer-
ence interferences with free trade efficiency aims. We have not come
close to exploring the role administrative agencies, the cultural ex-
perts, might play in eliminating friction in the burden on commerce
and preemption decisions.
In preemption cases, it is arguable that an unspoken theory of
legislation importantly influences a court's definition of local options.
The prevailing view of legislation is that of sustained consensus over
time, and this :theory would predict a stable allocation of authority
on a given subject. Another view,20 which I share, is that legislation
is better perceived as a temporary accommodation of interests which
comes apart over time. The idea is to recognize limits on the dead
hand of the past; call it a cultural revival. If this hypothesis was
explored, and I know of no attempts to do so, it would be unlikely to
yield a firm rate of decay of federal legislation. But the hypothesis
could be tested, and it would predict that over time congressional
policy judgments would be subject to redefinition by later executive,
state and local initiatives and by subsequent national legislation.
These contemporary policy moves would be sustained by doctrinal
techniques such as findings of no preemption. The description of the
resolving power of legislation over time could be represented by a
curve that slopes downward and then evens off as the courts insist
upon enforcing the core of even outdated legislation as the most re-
sponsible way to inspire a contemporary legislative judgment.2 1
C. Decision Theory and Game Theory
In many ways, natural resource law teachers use a tragedy of
the commons or prisoner's dilemma analysis to explore conservation
and allocation issues. These analyses point out that what is biologi-
cally or economically best for the individual is not necessarily best
for society. The pie is enlarged by constraining the individuals who
20. Davies, Gilmore & Calabresi, .A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Non-Pri-
macy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203 (1979); cf Michelman, Political Markets and Com-
munity Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy. 53
IND. L.J. 145 (1978).
21. E.g.. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 917 (1973).
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select the pieces. Garrett Hardin is popular among legal academics
because his prescription for the tragedy is "mutual coercion mutu-
ally agreed upon," that is, the law, which invites us to discuss actual
and hypothetical allocation arrangements ad infinitum.2
The analysis of the commons contains a wide variety of empiri-
cal and value questions of pertinence to legal outcomes. This in-
cludes what may be called the necessity of the individual override,
the excusable nature of the personal losses that combine to expand
the pie, the "invisible hand" aspects of remorseless events that may
bring social consequences beyond the range of human planning, and
the differences attending physical or economic definitions of the in-
teractions producing a dispute "in commons." A partial list of re-
lated issues includes:
-Whether social acceptability of the constraint (and therefore
the friction in enforcing it) varies depending upon the purpose of the
restriction. As an observer of the Northwest fishing scene, I have
long believed that fishermen are more inclined to tolerate conserva-
tion closures for the benefit of future generations than allocation clo-
sures for the benefit of other users. For one type of closure there is
an ethic of conservation, for the other an ethic of competition. In
game theory terms, the second but not necessarily the first, would be
considered a zero-sum transfer.
-It is clear that much wealth expectation in a resource com-
mons may be disappointed compatibly with notions of taking. Are all
"commons" redefinable by legislatures without compensation? 23 If
not, how are the core liability or property rights described?
-Contrast the process protections accorded losers outside the
commons looking in with losers inside the commons looking out. This
is another situation where the characterization of the expectation as
a property right influences the process protection that is afforded."
-Reconcile the oft-recommended solution to the tragedy of the
22. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see Ciriacy-
Wantrup & Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 713 (1975).
23. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). For
that matter, how is the "commons" defined? Do we have a conflict "in commons" if your
retention of your cow damages me in any way, by envy or otherwise? If so, the legislative
power to reallocate without compensation seems inadequately constrained. See Kennedy, supra
note 3, at 398-407; Rodgers, supra note 9.
24. Compare O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (residents
of a nursing home have no process right to hearing on government revocation of home's au-
thority) with Andrus v. Shell Oil Corp., 446 U.S. 657 (1980) (recognizing substantive right to
oil shale claims).
1981]
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commons, assignment of private property rights, with the strong re-
distributive themes of property "in common" confirmed by the mild
constraints of taking law in commons reallocations (above). Does
this lead to private management with heavy taxation obligations? 5
This defeats the tragedy of the commons but satisfies distributive
obligations implicit in the idea that some resource wealth is a gift of
nature in which we all have a stake.
-Consider the implications of the Supreme Court's recent ob-
servation that fishing rights enjoyed "in common" may be reallo-
cated to others if the wealth of the rights holder exceeds "moderate"
levels. 6 Of interest here is the idea that contributive or distributive
justice somehow should constrain wealth accumulations above a cer-
tain level. A legal perception of what is excessively rich is a conta-
gion not significantly influencing Supreme Court opinions on the
subject.
-Assume for the moment that some of the tougher resource
commons disputes (fishing, acid rain, grazing, ground water) are ef-
fectively unmanageable because the law cannot stem the tide of eco-
nomic self-interest and biological preference.' How might this fail-
ure in achieving the primary objectives affect agency allocation
practice and change? 28 Are agencies inclined to preside over the ex-
tirpation of a resource caught up in the decline of the commons or
do considerations of institutional self-interest dictate a fall-back
strategy that at least slows down the decline? 2'9
-Consider how expansion of our physical understanding of in-
teractions yielding costs and benefits will lead the law of "the com-
mons." What has been called the interest representation theory of
administrative law80 has been spawned largely by technological in-
fringements upon people quite distant. I assume that fluorcarbon
manufacturer and skin cancer victim alike have a variety of strong
25. See Pearse, Property Rights and the Regulation of Commercial Fisheries, in RE-
SOURCE POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 185 (P. N. Nemetz ed. 1980) (the Institute
for Research and Public Policy).
26. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 686-87 (1979).
27. MANAGING THE COMMONS (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 1977).
28. In particular, what are the implications for a theory of institutional change (e.g.,
sunset laws, government reorganizations, creation of new agencies, expansion and contraction
of agency powers)?
29. See W. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971);
J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
30. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
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process rights in agency decisions allocating waste absorption capaci-
ties of the ozone layer.
-Solving commons problems by the creation of private prop-
erty has both efficiency and rights implications. The idea of transfer-
able pollution rights has received rave reviews on efficiency
grounds,3 1 but the power of exclusion by a large rights-holder seems
to have generated little unfavorable comment. By contrast, the pros-
pect of tribal veto power over nontribal development decisions under
treaty provisions protecting "a right to take fish" is absolute in
tone;32 efficiency attacks take the form of the desirability of repudi-
ating the entitlement so that it can be placed in the hands of those
who assign it a "higher" value or who can produce "more" with it."
Another interesting idea from game theory is the zero-sum
transfer where A's gain is B's loss. There is considerable evidence in
political and administrative decisionmaking that zero-sum allocation
is decidedly taboo, for reasons easily intuited, and that "more is bet-
ter" solutions without losers are widely preferred. 4 It can be antici-
pated that as allocation decisions approach zero-sum transfers, the
sharper the conflicts, the greater the aggression, the higher the
peacekeeping and friction-avoidance costs, and the more deeply felt
the disappointment costs. Upon this empirical understanding, does it
follow that judicial review is more aggressive, assuring a stronger
process protection in subject areas that could be characterized as
zero-sum transfers? Along these lines, I have argued that assump-
tions about how agencies decide (for example, by muddling through)
are an important factor in the courts' perception of their review re-
31. Compare Comment, Increment Allocation Under Prevention of Significant Deterio-
ration: How to Decide Who Is Allowed to Pollute?, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 936 (1980); Note, The
EPA's Bubble Concept After Alabama Power, 32 STAN. L. REV. 943 (1980) with Mandelker
& Taub, Constitutional Limitations on Emission Quotas As An Air Pollution Control Strat-
egy, 8 ECOL. L. Q. 269 (1979).
32. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 206 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
33. On June 29, 1981, hearings were held in Seattle by the U.S. Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs on S. 874, a so-called steelhead decommercialization bill which would effec-
tively reallocate Indian commercial fishing rights to non-Indian sports fishermen. The bill
would provide the losing tribes with reasonable compensation but it was nonetheless resisted
bitterly as an involuntary divestiture of a treaty-secured property entitlement. At stake is that
all important difference between a property right and a liability right. See Calabresi & Me-
lamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Ingram, Laney & McCain, Water Scarcity and the Politics of Plenty in
the Four Corners States, 32 W. POL. Q. 298 (1979). See alsb Trelease, Uneasy Federal-
ism-State Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. REV. 751 (1980) (pointing
out how virtually no reallocation has accompanied assertion of federal reserved water rights).
1981]
222 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
sponsibilities3 Muddling through is sharply scrutinized, and mud-
dling A's expectation into B's pocket is intensively observed. Thus
emerges the hard look doctrine, by now a well recognized phenome-
non in contemporary administrative law.36
D. Philosophy and Economics
By necessity, legal academics are in the perpetual presence of
normative values and are called upon regularly to adjudge a particu-
lar outcome "right" or "wrong." This presupposes a baseline from
which we measure compliance, and this baseline is accepted as the
governing ethical arrangement. It seems inescapable that we are thus
forced into a consideration of ethical theories. There are many can-
didates, and only some of these theories are derived from human
preferences expressed biologically, culturally, or economically.
Moral philosophy may offer some guidance,' 7 but hardly in the
detail satisfactory for the particularized needs of the law. Philosophi-
cal theories like those of John Rawls, moreover, exude confidence in
the power of human rationality to prescribe just outcomes; there is
much to be said for the contrary view that many seemingly nonratio-
nal cultural practices reflect an unarticulated wisdom presumptively
deserving respect.38 Also, moral philosophy does not purport to be an
empirical science, and for this lawyer at least, that stance gives the
arguments a suspiciously hypothetical character. Rawls' fairminded
soul, hiding behind the veil of ignorance, resembles nobody I ever
knew, and in that respect is quite like the calculating rational person
of economic theory. These twin caricatures are hardly the full mea-
sure of human nature, although legal theorists sometimes act as if
35. Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in
Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 311 (1981); see Diver, Policymaking
Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARe. L. REV. 393 (1981); Mashaw, Conflict and
Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L. J. 181. For a critical
normative assessment of muddling through, see W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF
SCARCITY 191-97 (1977).
36. See, e.g., Delong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65
VA. L. REV. 257 (1979); O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the
Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980); Rodgers, A Hard
Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L. J. 699
(1979).
37. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Posner, Lawyers
as Philosophers: Ackerman and Others, 1981 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESOURCES J. 231.
38. See F. A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 162-63 (1979) (One of our
more important tasks is to discover the "significance of rules we never deliberately made");
Auerbach, The Relation of Legal Systems to Social Change, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1227, 1236-
37 (discussing the views of Montesquieu).
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they were.
Let me use as an illustration the case of Mr. Bryznowski, the
northern Minnesota farmer, who had the misfortune to lose one, per-
haps two, head of livestock to a pack of hungry wolves. 9 Bryznowski
then persuaded the Fish and Wildlife Service to assign a trapper, full
time, to hang around his farm and repulse the advances of the hun-
gry wolves. This conflict fits the classical nuisance pattern, and re-
source law teachers could be expected to turn to the popular eco-
nomic analyses for suggested solutions. Coase points out that
through exchange the parties can be expected to achieve the most
efficient combination of wolf-raising, and cow-rearing. 0 The idea of
Bryznowski negotiating with a pack of wolves troubles me not at all.
In fact, it might be easier to strike an understanding with wolves
than the operators of the chemical plants, pulp mills, and smelters
commonly invoked in Coasian analyses. Whatever may be said of
wolves, they keep their word, by which I mean behavior and needs
are predictable and consistent.
What is the least costly means of averting this wolf damage?
Indulge me further by assuming that Bryznowski, with the aid of the
Fish and Wildlife Service, can go forth and suppress or exterminate
the invaders at a cost of $400 a month; he can do nothing and accept
the loss, randomly inflicted against his stock, of $200 a month; or he
can select his puniest cow, at a cost of $100 per month, and stake it
out in the woods as a bribe to the pack. This bribe turns out to be
the efficient means of loss-avoidance. After all, in the causation-neu-
tral world of economics the loss can be attributed as much to the
tastiness of cows as to the hunger of wolves.
Will Bryznowski settle for the efficient outcome? Not likely
under a psychological or biological model of human behavior which
accepts people as they are, not as the reasonable economic beings
they are supposed to be. Bryznowski, under this view, would pursue
the absolutist line of complete defense because he perceives injustice
in this random misfortune, or because his genes recall the days
before the technology of firearms, or because he lives in a house of
straw. In the reported case, Bryznowski not only adhered to the ab-
solutist line but the Fish and Wildlife Service agreed with him.
While there may be no absolute rights to work or to eat, the right to
be free of wolves is decidedly nonutilitarian.
Nor would I expect Bryznowski to be any better as a philoso-
39. Fund for Animals v. Andrus (Minnesota Wolf Kill), 11 E.R.C. 2189 (1978).
40. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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pher than as an economist. How far would you get persuading him
to retreat behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance with one of the
wolves to talk things over on the assumption that either one might
emerge as farmer or wolf?41 It seems that any way the situation is
hypothecized, Bryznowski's biological vote, and probably the cultural
vote of his neighbors, is unlikely to be favorable to the wolves. In this
case, I would be unwilling to accept the local biological and cultural
preference, which is a reminder that the search for a governing ethic
in law is ongoing and demanding. It is tempting to invoke the rights
of wolves, or of people present and future who care about wolves, to
condemn Bryznowski's conviction as prejudice and his neighbors'
support as superstition. There is nothing central to his existence as a
farmer in northern Minnesota that turns on recognition of a continu-
ing right to exterminate wolves. Professors Coggins and Wilkinson
would compensate Bryznowski for loss of the right to be free of
wolves, pointing out that a payoff would be a tiny fraction of the cost
of trapper protection. 42 Wolf damage, in my opinion, is merely an-
other form of just loss not unlike that inflicted by a wide variety of
natural hazards.
With this much said, philosophy and economics can bring useful
points of view to the legal analysis of resource conflicts. Most natural
resource law teachers have had some trying, but perhaps not alto-
gether fruitless, attempts to derive specific "just" results from the
grand justice theories. For example:
-Have one of the contracting parties emerging from behind
Rawls' veil of ignorance take the form of a penguin or a wolf or a
41. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls' theory is an attempt to develop a
political relationship and citizenship status is a condition for retreating behind the veil of igno-
rance. There is not much justice here for nonhuman species. See P. SINGER, THE EXPANDING
CIRCLE: ETHICS & SOCIOBIOLOGY (1981). Professor Ackerman would deny citizenship status
to anyone not passing minimal dialogic tests required for citizenship. B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 37, at 71-72. But he puts a formidable case of an ape capable of challenging the legiti-
macy of the power relationship:
TRAINER: Hey! Where do you think you're going?
APE: Out of this cage.
TRAINER: Not if I have anything to say about it.
APE: Why should you have anything to say about it? I'm at least as good as you
are, and I have my own purposes in life.
Id. at 74. 1 have had such a conversation with a duck, conducted in duck language of course. I
complied with the demand to open the cage. Eventually we reached an accommodation under
which the cage would be opened when it became too confining but closed in the interests of
maintaining security. See also J. T. BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE IN ANIMALS
(1980).
42, See G. C. COGGINS & C. F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES
LAW 671 (1980).
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member of a distant generation."'
-Subject Nozick's entitlements, which depend upon a good
pedigree ("justice in acquisition")," to a few historical realities re-
garding desert lands, swamp lands, and railroad land grants.
-Ask if an ethics of wealth maximization 5 calls for compen-
sating the slaveowner for the losses attributable to the emancipation
proclamation.
-Consider the consequences for minority holdings and "ineffi-
cient" bundles of small property rights if the tendency of the com-
mon law is to favor "efficient" outcomes over time."
Usually judges and academics are willing to accept the legisla-
tive judgment as dictating the ethical necessities of a particular judi-
cial decision. Even as so circumscribed, the task of deriving and de-
fining the controlling legislative ethic is not easy. Courts are able to
deal rather routinely with what I will call the remote boundary
problems, staking out the administrative mandate in approximate
terms. May cost factors be taken into account in defining ambient
air standards?47 Has Tellico Dam been exempted from the Endan-
gered Species Act? 48 But to the extent courts are disinclined to de-
fine the legislative ethic and draw substantive lines, which happens
often, they are deferring to the administrative choice and reducing
the hard look doctrine solely to a process right. An example of de-
fault on close boundary issues, by a capable court, is Commonwealth
v. Andrus,49 the Georges Bank offshore oil leasing case. We are told
quite confidently that the statutory scheme there involved neither as-
sured nondegradation of the fish resource nor permitted its destruc-
tion"0 while the language of the opinion supports four or five possible
siandards between those extremes (including destruction of the re-
43. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 44-46 (1971).
44. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
45. Posner, supra note 1.
46. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977).
47. Compare Baram, Cost Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety,
and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOL. L. Q. 473 (1980) with Krier, The
Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 323 (1974). See also Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Deci-
sion Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, I ENVTL. L. 301 (1981).
48. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
49. 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979).
50. Id. at 889 ("the question is not whether the Secretary's task is to put the interest of
fishing 'above' everything else, on the one hand, or whether, on the other, he is mindlessly to
lease every square foot of seabottom at whatever risk to other resources.").
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source if justified on a cost-benefit basis)." While judicial opinions
are subject to interpretation, this one repudiates Dworkin and Posner
in the same breath; the consequence is that the agency is accorded
considerable room to roam, constrained only by process protections
for likely victims. Perhaps this close-boundary advice demands too
much of the courts; vague statutes are, not a new problem. But I
have long believed that the best cure for vagueness is to send a stat-
ute back to Congress bearing an interpretation and not the stamp of
uncertainty.
Finally, in the context of the ethical baseline, I will take up two
of the prominent process issues of contemporary natural resources
law-how much information is enough to permit an allocation deci-
sion (the problem of uncertainty), and the related question of how
much process should be extended potential losers.5 On both of these
issues fruitful lines of inquiry could be developed along conventional
efficiency lines: one should conduct the study or hold the hearing
only if the cost of the additional undertaking is less than the benefits
in decisional accuracy to be derived from this extra process. Because
I have a different ethical picture of the matter, I would suggest that
these questions are not answered by efficiency considerations; nor
should they be.
The problem of uncertainty, associated with speculative spil-
lover effects, is a problem of estimating losers and the extent of the
harm. The operative ethic is to discover and forewarn those subject
to risk."3 Exchange theory, assuming knowledgeable traders, has
nothing to do with this. While lines are drawn (some information is
"enough"), they are likely to embrace a nonutilitarian standard of
"best practice" to describe the extent of the ethical study commit-
ment. This is an assurance to the potential victims that they are not
mere subjects of barter but rather people to whom every obligation
of fair disclosure is owed. Whatever is said about NEPA, it is hardly
rash to suggest that the degree of documentation there called for
exceeds the efficiency "optimum." I suggest that it should, as the
price of fairness to ourselves, future generations, and nonhuman re-
sidents of the planet.
51. Id. at 888-92.
52. See, e.g., Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371 (1974); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due
Process, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
53. See E. F. MURPHY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL BALANCE (1980). See also Aus-
ness, High-Level Radioactive Waste Management: The Nuclear Dilemma, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
707, 756-58; Coburn, Imposing Risks, 62 PAC. PHIL. Q. 240 (1971).
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The question of how much process is enough is prominently
raised by the proliferation of one-stop siting or permitting proposals
and the celebrated Energy Mobilization Board. 4 Obviously, process
absolutists run into ever stronger utilitarian objections as hearings
proliferate and the length of time needed for decision approaches the
demonstrated lifespans of human beings and administration agen-
cies. How much is enough? Here, the ethical question does not in-
volve disclosure and battling the unknown as much as giving known
or likely victims (at least those who believe they are victims) the
opportunity to present their views and persuade decisionmakers to
modify their ways. This is quintessentially a question of personal jus-
tice, not societal well being, and it requires us to give losers their due
though society gets nothing tangible in return. Many of us have at-
tended hearings that were demonstrably useless in adducing infor-
mation of any pertinence whatsoever to the decision. Yet these same
hearings may be neither psychologically nor legally useless.
Fair process is something, like currency, we can always produce
more of. While too much of this good may cheapen this value over
time and cross the line between fairness and obstructionism, it is well
to remember that process is not subject to the iron rules of zero-sum
restraint that nonrenewable resources are.55 We can afford to be
more generous with process fairness than with fair shares of scarce
goods. I am convinced that the "correct" amount of process fairness
is more likely to be derived from a personal ethic attentive to losers
than from a balancing ethic attentive to hearing people out only to
the .extent the value of what they say exceeds the cost of the hearing.
E. Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to identify ideas, mostly from
the natural sciences, which can be put to use in the construction of
legal theory. While this sort of approach is not now widespread, I am
optimistic about its usefulness. The law deals, after all, with the or-
dering of human behavior. Scientific insights into this behavior,
whether examining motivations, preferences or otherwise, deal neces-
sarily with the facts that determine whether law is effective law.
Scientific theories are important in another way. Legal scholars,
54. See Fisher, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field of Energy Resource Develop-
ment: Some Questions and Suggestions, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 785 (1981); Guida & Solimine,
Congressional Power and the Federal System: A Constitutional Analysis of the Proposed
Energy Mobilization Board, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
55. J. RIVKIN, ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW (1980); L. C. THUROW, THE ZERO-
SUM SOCIETY (1980).
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especially teachers, are constantly searching for the metaphors that
characterize and explain. Suggestive metaphors can grow into mod-
els, and they carry their own hypotheses which can be subjected to
testing and further refinement.
In the past, the social sciences have been influenced by powerful
ideas from the natural sciences. Evolution has been put to use in all
sorts of things-will-get-better theories, and the entropy laws invoked
to demonstrate that things will get worse. This cross-disciplinary use
of theoretical models is hardly surprising when it is recognized that
theory represents not pieces of reality but pictures of the world, not
truth but patterns of thinking.
Theoretical ideas are transferable to a variety of contexts, pend-
ing proof of course that they do not belong there. The law, in its
many expressions, offers a great deal of data which can be used to
confirm or disprove these theoretical hypotheses. In the end, I must
admit, this paper is a plea to multiply the metaphors of legal re-
search. This advice is suggested by the inadequacies of the old meta-
phors but it is inspired by the allure of the new.
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